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are, and courts as willing to construe it liberally,34 the case requiring a square over-
ruling may be long in coming.
Constitutional Law-Deprivation of Right to Assistance of Counsel by Appointment
of Attorney Representing Co-conspirator-[United States].-Glasser and Kretske, as-
sistant United States attorneys, were convicted of a conspiracy to defraud the govern-
ment by fixing liquor tax violations. x At the trial, one of Kretske's lawyers was unable
to appear and Kretske moved for a continuance, being dissatisfied with his remaining
counsel. The court suggested that StewartY one of Glasser's attorneys, act also for
Kretske. Stewart raised the question of a possible conflict of interests,3 and Glasser also
objected. The court then directed Kretske's lawyer to stay in the case. After a con-
ference at the defense table, Stewart indicated his willingness to represent Kretske.
Glasser, who was present, did not renew his objection. Appealing his conviction,
Glasser contended that he had been denied the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment.4 He also contended that he had been denied a trial by an impartial
jury, alleging that all the women on the panel were members of the Illinois League of
Women Voters, and were biassed in favor of the prosecution, having attended lectures
on jury service sponsored by the league.s These allegations were supported by Glas-
ser's affidavit. The conviction was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals.6 On writ
of certiorari the Supreme Court held, the trial court, by suggesting that counsel for one
defendant represent a co-defendant, infringed the former's right to assistance of coun-
sel, and it was not necessary to determine the "precise degree of prejudice" resulting
therefrom. Mere acquiescence by defendant was not a waiver of the right. A jury, se-
lected from a private organization, and partisan by training, is not representative of the
community, and had a proper offer of proof of these allegations been made, a new trial
of all the defendants would have been necessary, but defendant's affidavit was not a
sufficient offer of proof. Judgment reversed as to Glasser, two justices dissenting. Glas-
ser v. United States.7
34 Compare the attitudes of the commissions and the Court in the two most recent previous
cases which afforded opportunities to overrule Smyth v. Ames: Railroad Com'n of California
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1938), and Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co.,
307 U.S. io4 (1939). The principal case is a continuation of this mutual accommodation.
The Federal Power Commission, however, is now forcing the issue by refusing to allow evi-
dence of reproduction cost to be admitted in rate cases.
x Section 37, Criminal Code, Rev. Stat. § 544o (1875), i8 U.S.C.A. § 88 (1927).
2 William Scott Stewart, author of Stewart on Trial Strategy (i94o).
3 Stewart also raised the objection that his representation of Kretske might tend to asso-
ciate Glasser with Kretske in the minds of the jurors, but he later decided that no harm would
result in this respect if the jurors were informed of the circumstances of his appointment.
R., at i8o, 183.
4 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to .... trial, by an im-
partial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, .... and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
s He also alleged that women otherwise qualified, but not members of the league, were
systematically excluded. There were six women on the jury in the instant case.
6 United States v. Glasser, 116 F. (2d) 6go (C.C.A. 7th i94o).
762 S. Ct. 457 (1942), noted in 28 A.B.A.J. 190 (1942), and io Kan. City L. Rev. 117
(1942).
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It is difficult to determine from the majority opinion whether the holding in the in-
stant case should be taken to mean that the appointment of a defendant's counsel to
represent a co-defendant in a conspiracy case is an infringement of the right to assist-
ance of counsel regardless of whether there is a showing of specific acts of prejudice, or
that the defendant in this case was in fact prejudiced by the action of the trial court.
If the former interpretation is the one intended, the holding seems to go beyond former
decisions of the Court.8 If the latter interpretation is the correct one, the majority's
view of the facts is questionable. Only two specific instances of prejudice to Glasser
were alleged. The first was Stewart's failure to cross-examine a witness, Brantman,
who testified that he did not know Glasser, when Brantman was recalled to the stand
after this testimony had been contradicted by another witness. Stewart stated to the
court that he did not cross-examine Brantman because he feared Brantman would lie
if he did so. 9 Brantman's testimony was very damaging to KretskeIo and Stewart
may have felt it would be against Kretske's interest to focus attention on Brantman
again. x" It is possible that a lawyer alert to protect Glasser would have had Brantman
reiterate his lack of acquaintance with Glasser; but Brantman had been emphatic on
this point on direct examination,- and the context of the second witness's testimony
indicated its unreliability.3 If Brantman's veracity was uncertain, Glasser's interests
may in fact have been best served by leaving well enough alone.
The second alleged instance of prejudice related to Stewart's failure to object to the
admission of testimony as to statements made by Kxetske, not in Glasser's presence,
implicating Glasser. While the declarations of one conspirator made to a third party
are not admissible against an alleged co-conspirator unless the connection of the latter
with the conspiracy can be established by other evidence,14 a slight amount of such
8 In Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (194o), the Court held that it was not a denial of due
process for a state court to refuse the request of recently appointed counsel for additional time
in which to prepare the defense, where it did not appear that the result would have been
changed thereby. The rule is the same in the federal courts under the Sixth Amendment.
Crouch v. United States, 298 Fed. 437 (C.C.A. 6th 1924); Crono v. United States, 59 F. (2d)
339 (C.C.A. 9 th 1932); Nuefield v. United States, 118 F. (2d) 373 (App. D.C. 1941). See also
note i! infra.
9 This explanation was made just before sentence was passed on the defendants. The court
responded that it thought Stewart had used good judgment. R., at 1o62.
xo Brantman testified that he took $3,ooo from Abosketes, a bootlegger, and gave it to
Kretske. R., at 652.
"However, Stewart first asked for permission to cross-examine him at a later time, R.,
at 663, and delayed his announcement that he "wanted nothing further to do with him" until
Brantman had resumed the stand, R., at 711.
-R., at 656.
'3 The "second witness" referred to above was Abosketes, who stated that Brantman knew
Glasser, "and that was all there was to it." R., at 668. But he admitted that he himself did
not know Glasser and had not known Brantman before giving him the money. R., at 668.
He gave it to him because he seemed to have "first class information" about the pending prose-
cution. R., at 669. He was "kind of hoping" Brantman would be able to fix Glasser, but did
not know and did not ask to whom Brantman gave the money, because "when you get pro-
tection .... you don't ask too many questions." R., at 670.
14 Clune v. United States, 5s9 U.S. 590, 592 (1895); Minner v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 5o6,
,51 (C.C.A. ioth 1932).
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other evidence is sufficient,' s and the order of proof is within the discretion of the trial
court.' 6 Since there was other evidence implicating Glasser, the evidence in question
was admissible, and, as is pointed out in the dissenting opinion,17 Stewart's failure to
make a frivolous objection to it does not seem prejudicial. 8
Ordinarily, the actions of the trial court in matters relating to the conduct of the
trial will not be interfered with by a reviewing court unless it can be shown that they
affected the result of the case. 9 Without a showing of any clear instances of prejudice,
the mere possibility that Stewart's representation of Glasser might in some way have
been more effective had he not undertaken the additional burden of representing Kret-
ske would not seem to warrant reversal, particularly inasmuch as Stewart consented
to the arrangement. 20 However, the case against Glasser was admittedly weakn2 The
evidence against him consisted partly of statements by the other conspirators as to his
is See United States v. Baker, 61 F. (2d) 469 (C.C.A. 2d 1932), cert. den. 288 U.S. 602
(1933).
x6 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1079 (1940); Thiede v. Utah Territory, 5S9 U.S. 510, 519 (1895);
Hoeppel v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 237, 242 (App. D.C. x936); Baker v. United States,
2r F. (2d) 903, 905 (C.C.A. 4 th 1927).
'7 Glasser v. United States, 62 S. Ct. 457, 475 (1942).
i 8 Immediately after he accepted the appointment to represent Kretske, Stewart suggested
to the court that it would be desirable if after an objection had nce been made, defendants'
rights could be preserved without repetitious objections on the same ground. The court di-
rected that the record show all adverse rulings carried exception. R., at i85. This was re-
peated. R., at i95, 68o. At p. 53 of Glasser's reply brief in the Supreme Court it is said: "....
[the] context [R., at 449 et seq.] conclusively shows that he [Stewart] at all times vigorously
asserted for his client the right to be tried on no hearsay evidence ..... " In the instances in
which Stewart did not object, note 22 infra, the context made it clear to the jury what the
testimony would be. In three of the instances the questions were asked by the court. R., at
243, 297, 3o6. In others, Stewart had objected that the questions were leading. R., at 229, 245.
In these circumstances, Stewart and the other defense counsel may well have felt that objec-
tions that the evidence was inadmissible as to Glasser would merely emphasize it. To the
crucial testimony of Alexander Campbell, Assistant United States District Attorney for the
Northern District of Indiana, that Roth had tried to bribe him in Kretske's presence, and had
told him "we handle cases in Chicago that way sometimes," Stewart filed a formal motion to
exclude, R., at 98, 678; and the jury was excused while the motion was argued, R., at 679.
19 In Shores v. United States, go F. (2d) 942 (C.C.A. 9th 1935), cert. den. 297 U.S. 705
(1936), noted in 22 Va. L. Rev. 957 (i936), the conviction in a conspiracy case of a defendant
who was forced by the court to accept representation by the attorney for a co-defendant when
his own lawyer was unable to appear was affirmed on the ground that the result would not
"rightly" have been different, had defendant's own counsel conducted his case. One judge
dissented strongly, on the ground that numerous specific instances of prejudice were shown.
See also the cases cited in notes 8 and 16 supra.
20 The dissenting justices thought it clear that the arrangement was voluntarily assumed
by the parties. Glasser v. United States, 62 S. Ct. 457, 474 (1942). It is worthy of notice that
attorney George Callaghan, who represented Glasser in the preliminary stages of the proceed-
ing, continued as associate counsel after Stewart entered the case and participated in Glasser's
defense at the trial. Brief for United States in the Supreme Court, at 63.
21 Glasser v. United States, 62 S. Ct. 457, 463 (1942), referring to Brief for United States in
the Supreme Court, at 6.
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complicity,22 and partly of circumstantial evidence of doubtful lrobative value-e.g.,
that he had dismissed cases or failed to present them to the grand jury without appar-
ent satisfactory reasons.'2 There was no single piece of evidence conclusively connect-
ing him with the conspiracy. It is therefore possible that Stewart's dual role was an
important factor in persuading the jury of Glasser's association with the other con-
spirators. The possibility of prejudice from this combination of circumstances may
have considerably influenced that majority of the court.
If Glasser was in fact prejudiced by Stewart's acceptance of the appointment to
represent Kretske, it is open to question whether his apparent acquiescence should not
prevent him from objecting now. It has been settled that the right to representation
by counsel may be waived,24 although, since the right is a fundamental one, the courts
will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.?s A waiver is not binding
unless it was intelligently and competently made,26 but the determination of whether
there has been an intelligent waiver must depend upon the particular facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding each case, including the background, experience, and conduct
of the accused. 7 In the instant case Glasser, an experienced criminal trial lawyer,
made no objection to Stewart's dual role at any time during the course of the trial, in
his plea to the court before sentence was passed upon him, or in his assignment of
grounds for appeal. The point was first raised fifteen weeks after the close of the trial,
when a "joint and several assignment of error" was filed.' 8 Under these circumstances,
to require a new trial is indeed to "strain the concept of fairness till it is narrowed to a
filament."29
"Thus Swanson, a bootlegger, testified (after his memory had been refreshed by the prose-
cuting attorney) that Kretske had told .him part of a bribe would go to Glasser. R., at 230.
Similar testimony was given by Del Rocco, R., at 243, 245, and Hodorowicz, R., at 297, mem-
bers of the same gang; and by Raubunas, R., at 5io, and Dewes, R., at 543, who also were
bootleggers.
' 2E.g., Raubunas, note 22 supra, and two other members of his group were no-billed on
Glasser's advice, but were indicted by Glasser's successor, Brief for United States in the Su-
preme Court, at 25, and convicted. Investigator Bailey testified that Glasser had continued
cases pending against the Hodorowicz group over his objection. R., at 649, 71o. Glasser re-
fused to let Investigator Dowd testify in a libel action against an automobile belonging to the
Raubunas group, R., at 219, and the libel was dismissed. Glasser also advised Hodorowicz as
to the choice of a defense attorney, R., at 302, and Hodorowicz sent him a case of liquor for
Christmas, R., at 302.
'4 Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 72 (19o4). The Fourteenth Amendment has not
yet been held to require the states to provide counsel except in capital cases. Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); Gall v. Brady, 3 9 F. Supp. 504 (Md. 1941); cf. Smith v. O'Grady,
312 U.S. 329 (1941).
SOhio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Com'n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937); Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
6Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
Thus an insane person may not waive representation, even though he appears normal at the
time. Williams v. State, 163 Ark. 623, 26o S.W. 721 (1924).
27 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
28 Glasser v. United States, 62 S. Ct. 457, 473 (1942).
'9 Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,' 122 (1934).
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Glasser's second ground of appeal-that he had not been tried by an impartial jury
-would require a reversal, if the allegations could be sustained by proof that the
jurors were biassed.3o Membership in the league would not of itself be a ground for dis-
qualification unless the league were actively interested in the litigation.3' It was not
improper for the league to submit a list of prospective jurors,32 although it is improper
to delegate the final choice to it, no matter how high-minded its motives.3 However,
the disqualification of jurors on ground of bias is peculiarly a matter for the trial
court,3 4 and reviewing courts are sparing in the use of their powers to set aside its de-
cision.3s Glasser based his affidavit on an article written by one of the women of the
panel from which the jury was selected.36 The trial court considered his petition and
was convinced that the defendants were not prejudiced by the composition of the
jury; and the circuit court of appeals held that the trial court had not abused its dis-
cretion.37 Clearly, the jury should be a body truly representative of the community;38
but this doctrine grew out of, and primarily relates to, the exclusion of persons from the
jury lists on account of racial discrimination.39 It may be questioned whether its ap-
plication in the instant case is entirely consistent with its history and traditional
usage.
Copyrights-Assignability of Right of Renewal-[Federal].-In 1912, Graff, a lyri-
cist, assigned to the'plaintiff music publishers the copyright to his lyric, "When Irish
Eyes Are Smiling," pursuant to a general royalty agreement under which Graff was
30 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 678 (8th ed. 1927); Wood v. United States, 83 F.
(2d) 587, 589 (App. D.C. 1936).
3' Remus v. United States, 291 Fed. 501 (1923), cert. den. 263 U.S. 717 (1924) (member-
ship in Anti-Saloon League in case involving violation of National Prohibition Act); Noonan
v. Saline County Coal Co., i73 Ill. App. 541 (1912) (membership in United Mine Workers
in case between member of union and his employer); Musick v. People, 40 Ill. 268 (i866)
(membership in society for detection and prosecution of horse thieves in prosecution for
stealing a horse). See 31 A.L.R. 411 (1924).
32 Walker v. United States, 93 F. (2d) 383 (C.C.A. 8th 1937).
33 United States v. Murphy, 224 Fed. 554 (D.C.N.Y. 1915). Thus, the clerk may not ex-
clude names otherwise qualified, merely because they do not appear in the list submitted by
the league. Cf. United States v. Ballard, 35 F. Supp. xo5 (Cal. I94O).
34 Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (igog); Union Electric Light & Power Co.
v. Snyder Estate, 65 F. (2d) 297 (C.C.A. 8th 1933).
3s Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878); Frank v. United States, 59 F. (2d)
670, 675 (C.C.A. 9th 1932).
36 Women and the Law, 26 A.B.A.J. 354 (zg4o). The writer states: "With one exception,
the women were all members of the League of Women Voters, who had been recommended by
that organization at the invitation of the court." In the same article it is said: "All the infor-
mation we had, had been given us by members of the Bar Association and distinguished
judges."
37 United States v. Glasser, 16 F. (2d) 69o, 705 (C.C.A. 7th 194o).
38 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
39 Strauder v. West Virginia, ioo U.S. 303, 309 (1879); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 319
(i9o6); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228 (194o).
